Managing non-cooperative behaviors in consensus-based multiple attribute group decision making:An approach based on social network analysis by Zhang, Hengjie et al.
                          Zhang, H., Palomares Carrascosa, I., Dong, Y., & Wang, W. (2018).
Managing non-cooperative behaviors in consensus-based multiple attribute
group decision making: An approach based on social network analysis.
Knowledge-Based Systems, 162, 29-45.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2018.06.008,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2018.06.008
Peer reviewed version
License (if available):
CC BY-NC-ND
Link to published version (if available):
10.1016/j.knosys.2018.06.008
10.1016/j.knosys.2018.06.008
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the accepted author manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Elsevier at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2018.06.008 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the
publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
1 
 
 
Managing non-cooperative behaviors in consensus-based 
multiple attribute group decision making: An approach based on 
social network analysis1 
Hengjie Zhanga, Iván Palomaresb, Yucheng Dongc,*, Weiwei Wanga 
a Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China 
b School of Computer Science, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, and Engineering Maths. 
University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom 
c Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract: In consensus-based multiple attribute group decision making (MAGDM) problems,  
it is frequent that some experts exhibit non-cooperative behaviors owing to the different areas to 
which they may belong and the different (sometimes conflicting) interests they might present. This 
may adversely affect the overall efficiency of the consensus reaching process, especially when 
some uncooperative behaviors by experts arise. To this end, this paper develops a novel consensus 
framework based on Social Network Analysis (SNA) to deal with non-cooperative behaviors. In 
the proposed SNA-based consensus framework, a trust propagation and aggregation mechanism to 
yield experts’ weights from the social trust network is presented, and the obtained weights of 
experts are then integrated into the consensus-based MAGDM framework. Meanwhile, a 
non-cooperative behavior analysis module is designed to analyze the behaviors of experts. Based 
on the results of such analysis during the consensus process, each expert can express and modify 
the trust values pertaining other experts in the social trust network. As a result, both the social trust 
network and the weights of experts derived from it are dynamically updated in parallel. A 
simulation and comparison study is presented to demonstrate the efficiency of the SNA-based 
consensus framework for coping with non-cooperative behaviors. 
 
Keywords: Multiple attribute group decision making, consensus reaching process, 
non-cooperative behaviors, social network analysis 
1. Introduction 
Group decision making (GDM) is a powerful decision tool to deal with complex decision 
problems in which a single expert may feel difficult to consider all the aspects of the particular 
decision problem at hand [30, 36, 59]. Numerous GDM models and approaches have been 
reported to integrate the knowledge and levels of experience associated with a group of experts 
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(e.g., [12, 35, 37]). Conventional GDM models focus on the problem of obtaining a ranking of a 
group of feasible alternatives to the decision problem without addressing whether or not a 
reasonable consensus level among experts can be guaranteed. The consensus reaching process 
(CRP) is an effective way to assist experts improving the consensus level, which has been widely 
utilized in the GDM literature [3, 13, 20, 21, 28, 33, 40, 44].  
Traditionally, the CRP is guided by a “hard” consensus measure that only distinguishes 
between two possible values or degrees: 0 (no consensus or partial consensus) and 1 (full 
consensus). However, it is very time-consuming, difficult and unnecessary to achieve a full 
consensus in many practical GDM problems [31]. As a result, the concept of “soft” consensus [2, 
5, 6, 9, 11, 27, 69, 73] has been proposed and used widely in a variety of proposed models for 
CRPs:  
(1) CRPs with preference representation formats. For instance, Xu et al. [58] proposed a CRP 
for GDM with hesitant fuzzy preference relations and discussed its application in water allocation 
management. Moreover, Xu et al. [61] presented a distance-based CRP for GDM with 
multiplicative preference relations. Further, Herrera-Viedma et al. [29], and Choudhury et al. [10] 
presented several CRPs to deal with GDM with heterogeneous preference representation formats. 
Chen et al. [8] provided a survey for CRPs with heterogeneous preference representation formats.    
(2) Minimum-cost (or adjustments) based CRPs. Several CRPs based on preserving minimum 
adjustments or cost have been investigated. Ben-Arieh et al. [4] proposed a CRP model with 
quadratic cost functions. Moreover, Wu et al. [54] reported a model with a minimum adjustment 
cost based feedback mechanism for GDM in social networks with distributed linguistic trust 
information. In addition, a consensus model with minimum cost policy has been investigated by 
Gong et al. [21-24] and Zhang et al. [70]. 
(3) CRPs driven by consistency and consensus measures. To maintain individual consistency 
in the consensus building, several approaches for CRPs based on individual consistency and 
consensus measures have been proposed. For example, Escobar et al. [19] developed a precise 
consistency consensus matrix-based approach to managing individual consistency and consensus 
in AHP-GDM. Wu et al. [57] presented an iteration-based approach to address individual 
consistency and consensus in GDM with multiplicative preference relations. Dong et al. [14] 
presented an optimization-based CRP model to deal with individual consistency and consensus in 
GDM under multi-granular unbalanced 2-tuple linguistic preference relations. 
(4) CRPs in a dynamic/Web context. Societal and technological trends demand the 
management of CRPs under dynamic and Web contexts. To address these complex contexts, Pérez 
et al. [45] proposed a dynamic CRP to manage decision situations in which the set of alternatives 
3 
 
changes dynamically. Alonso et al. [1], Zadrozny and Kacprzyk [68] and Kacprzyk and Zadrozny 
[32] investigated web-based consensus support systems, while Dong et al. [17] reported a CRP 
model for complex and dynamic GDM frameworks. 
(5) CRPs in multiple attribute group decision making (MAGDM) problems. In some GDM 
problems, experts evaluate alternatives based on multiple attributes [49], leading to what it has 
been known as a MAGDM problem. Several CRPs for MAGDM have been reported. For example, 
Kim et al. [34] suggested a CRP model for the MAGDM problem under contexts of 
incompleteness. By considering the degrees of confidence of experts’ opinions, Guha and 
Chakraborty [26] developed a consensus model for MAGDM. Wu and Xu [56] presented a CRP 
model for MAGDM under the hesitant fuzzy linguistic context. Recently, Zhang et al. [70] 
reported a 2-rank base CRP model in multi-granular linguistic MAGDM problems. Additional 
CRP approaches for MAGDM settings can be found in [38, 48, 56, 62]. 
Importantly, real-world GDM situations involve not only mathematical aspects but also 
psychological behaviors of experts [15]. Several CRPs approaches considering the 
behaviors/attitudes/trust of experts have been devised [27, 41, 42, 46, 47]. In particular, the 
existence and management of non-cooperative behaviors in CRPs has been tackled by several 
researchers (e.g., [43, 60]), demonstrating that it supposes a critical aspect deserving further 
investigation. Pelta and Yager [43] and Yager [63, 64] studied the non-cooperative behaviors in 
GDM problems. In their works, the non-cooperative behaviors are referred to strategic preference 
manipulation behaviors and they are only investigated in the selection process of GDM problems 
(i.e. problems that do not involve a consensus building phase). However, these non-cooperative 
behaviors are often accrued during the consensus phase of a GDM problem. Palomares et al. [42] 
designed a moderator-based approach for coping with non-cooperative behaviors in the CRP of 
GDM problems involving large groups, in which a moderator compulsively penalizes the weights 
of the experts who adopt non-cooperative behaviors. Recently, Dong et al. [18] proposed a 
self-management mechanism for dealing with non-cooperative behaviors in a CRP for GDM with 
fuzzy preference relations. Moreover, Social Network Analysis (SNA) has emerged as a key 
technique in GDM problems with the development of information and network technology. On the 
one hand, a social network provides valuable decision information about the social relationships 
among the experts and allows information exchange and communication. On the other hand, 
experts are easy to be influenced by their most trusted experts in the social network, thereby 
affecting the GDM result. Wu et al. [53, 55] developed two SNA-based approaches for 
undertaking CRPs in which the trust relationship among experts is considered. 
According to the above literature review, we find that consensus reaching has become a hot 
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topic in the area of GDM, and a considerable number of models for supporting CRPs have been 
reported. It is worth emphasizing that several SNA-based approaches have been proposed. In the 
SNA-based CRPs, a lot of non-cooperative behaviors exist, for example, some experts will 
express their preferences dishonestly to pursue their own interests. This situation may adversely 
affect the decision efficiency. To guarantee the decision efficiency and improve the SNA-based 
CRPs results, it becomes paramount to develop some SNA-based consensus approaches to cope 
with non-cooperative behaviors. Although several models under a social network context have 
been proposed, they do not take non-cooperative behaviors of participants into account. Moreover, 
the social network in a SNA-based CRP is assumed unchanged during the consensus reaching. In 
addition, the existing moderator-based models cannot be directly extended to deal with 
non-cooperative behaviors in SNA-based CRPs, due to the moderator’s task of dealing with these 
behaviors being sometimes excessively demanding and complicated in practical decision 
situations. Motivated with the challenge to cope with non-cooperative behaviors in CRPs based on 
inter-expert trust information, this paper develops an SNA-based consensus framework for dealing 
with non-cooperative behaviors in CRPs in a dynamic social network and MAGDM context. 
In the proposed SNA-based consensus framework, the experts express not only decision 
matrices regarding a group of alternatives and attributes but also trust values for other experts in 
their social trust network. Through a trust propagation and aggregation process on the provided 
trust values, a complete pairwise trust model is determined. Then, an approach is used to generate 
the weights of experts predicated on this social trust network information. The experts’ weights 
generated from the social trust network are thus embedded into the CRP. During the CRP, the 
experts not only adjust their decision matrices to achieve the predefined consensus level, but they 
can also update their initially provided degrees of trust towards other experts in the social network. 
In particular, we introduce a novel module for non-cooperative behaviors analysis, which has been 
designed to analyze the behaviors of experts. The analysis results produced by the module are 
provided for experts, who in turn modify their trust relationships in the social trust network 
accordingly. In this way, the weights of the experts with non-cooperative behaviors will be 
decreased as a result of undertaking the overall proposed SNA-based approach. We present a 
detailed simulation and a comparative experimental study to demonstrate the decision efficiency 
of the SNA-based consensus framework for coping with non-cooperative behaviors. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first consensus approach for MAGDM capable of meaningfully 
synergizing inter-user trust information, multiple patterns of non-cooperative behavior and expert 
weighting over the course of the CRP. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces preliminaries regarding 
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the SNA. Then, Section 3 describes the consensus-based MAGDM problem with non-cooperative 
behaviors and proposes a SNA-based consensus framework. Several types of non-cooperative 
behaviors are analyzed in Section 4. An illustrative example is provided in Section 5. Following 
this, simulation and comparison experiments are presented in Section 6. Finally, concluding 
remarks are drawn in Section 7. 
 
2. Social network analysis 
SNA (Social network analysis) has emerged as a key technique in modern sociology, and it 
focuses on the relationships between social entities such as families, corporations or nations [51]. 
The existing SNA foundations and methodologies to model social trust relationships among a 
group of individuals (or experts), have proved their usefulness upon their adoption in several 
GDM approaches [35, 52, 53, 55]. 
2.1. The structure of the social network 
Three elements are included in a social network: the set of actors, the relations themselves, 
and the actor attributes, which are described in Table 1. The following three representation 
schemes are often adopted to describe the main elements in a social network: 
(1) Graph theoretic: the social network is characterized as a graph in which nodes are 
connected by directed lines. In the graph, i je e→  signifies that expert ie  directly trusts expert 
je . 
(2) Sociometric: the trust relationships among experts are represented by a matrix 
( )ij m mS s =  ( {0,1}ijs  ), which is called sociometric. In particular, 1ijs =  denotes that there 
exists a direct trust relationship from expert ie  to expert je . 
(3) Algebraic: this notation allows to distinguish several distinct relations and represent 
combinations of relations. 
Table 1: Different representation schemes in SNA 
Graph Sociometric Algebraic 
3e 4e
5e
1e
2e
 
0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
S
 
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
 
1 2  e R e , 1 3  e R e , 1 5  e R e  
2 3  e R e , 3 4  e R e , 4 1  e R e  
5 2  e R e , 5 4  e R e  
However, the above sociometric represents a binary relation among social entities (i.e. either 
there is total trust or no trust at all), which is not be suitable to model uncertainty in trust 
relationship representation in a social network [55]. To overcome this problem, this paper adopts 
one type of social networks, namely social trust network in which the users explicitly express their 
opinion about other users as trust degrees that vary between 0 and 1. In this situation, the 
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sociometric in a social trust network is called fuzzy sociometric, which is formally defined below. 
Definition 1: A fuzzy sociometric ( )ij m mS s =  on E  is a relation in E E  with 
membership function Su : [0,  1]E E → , and ( ,  )S i j iju e e s= , where [0,  1]ijs   denotes the trust 
degree that expert 
ie  assigns to expert je . 
For notation simplicity, fuzzy sociometric will be herein referred to as sociometric in the 
paper. 
Example 1: The trust relationships across a group of six experts are represented in direct 
graph form as in Table 1 with the following sociometric ( )ij m mS s = : 
0.7 0.8 0 0.85
0 0.78 0 0
0 0 0.88 0
0.9 0 0 0
0 0.95 0 1
S
− 
 
− 
 = −
 
− 
 − 
. 
2.2. Trust propagation in the social trust network 
In a social trust network, some experts may not be able to provide a trust value on a specific 
expert directly. In this case, the sociometric associated with the social trust network is incomplete. 
This is illustrated in Fig. 1 (a). In this figure, three experts are included, and there is no direct trust 
value between expert 1e  and 3e . However, some information on whether or not expert 1e  can 
trust expert 3e  can still be inferred, based on transitivity. Therefore, it is necessary to design a 
mechanism to analyze whether an unknown expert can be trusted or not. Victor et al. [50] 
proposed a trust propagation approach based on t-norms to estimate unknown trust values in the 
sociometric, which will be adopted in this paper. 
Before formally presenting the trust propagation method, some concepts regarding triangular 
norms are introduced. 
A function T : 2[0,  1] [0,  1]→  is called a triangular norm (t-norm for short) if and only if it 
is commutative, associative, monotonic and satisfies the following boundary conditions 
( ,  1)T x x= , x . In the following, we use the Einstein product as the t-norm: 
1 2
1 2
1 2
( ,  )
1 (1 ) (1 )
a a
T a a
a a

=
+ −  −
,                           (1) 
where 1 [0,  1]a   and 2 [0,  1]a   are two real numbers. It is worth mentioning that 
1 2 1 2( ,  ) min{ ,  }T a a a a , for any T-norm function T. 
In Eq. (1), there are only two arguments. By taking n arguments into account, the following 
t-norm is considered: 
1
1 2
1 1
2
( ,  ,  ...,  )
(2 )
n
ii
n n n
i ii i
a
T a a a
a a
=
= =
=
− +

 
                   (2) 
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where [0,  1]ia   ( 1,  2,  ...,  i n= ). We have that 1 2 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  ) min( ,  ,  ...,  )n nT a a a a a a . 
3e1e
2e
12s 23s
            
3e1e
2e
12s 23s
13 12 23( ,  )s T s s=
 
(a) No direct trust between 
1e  and 3e     (b) Trust propagation between 1e  and 3e  via 2e  
Fig. 1. Trust propagation via indirect trust path 
Let 
1 2 3 4 1
(1) (2) (3) ( )...
q q
i q je e e e e e   
+⎯⎯→ ⎯⎯→ ⎯⎯→ ⎯⎯→ ⎯⎯→ ⎯⎯→  be a path from expert ie  
to expert je , where its length is 1q + . The trust value ijs  can be estimated using t-norm: 
, (1) (1), (2) ( ), 
1
, (1) ( ), ( ), ( 1)1
1 1
, (1) ( ), ( ), ( 1) , (1) ( ), ( ), ( 1)1 1
( ,  ,  ...,  )
2
(2 )(2 ) (2 )
ij i q j
q
i q j k kk
q q
i q j k k i q j k kk k
s T s s s
s s s
s s s s s s
   
   
       
−
+=
− −
+ += =
=
 
=
− − − + 

 
      (3) 
Example 2: In Fig. 1 (b), we consider that 23 0.95s =  and 12 0.9s = . Then, the trust degree 
from expert 1e  to 3e  can be calculated as 13 12 23( ,  ) (0.9,  0.95) 0.851s T s s T= = = . 
2.3. Trust aggregation in the social trust network 
In some situations, there may be multiple trust paths between two experts. This is 
demonstrated in Fig. 2, in which there exist two trust paths from expert 1e  to 3e : (1) 
1 2 3e e e→ → ; and (2) 1 5 4 3e e e e→ → → . 
3e 4e
5e
1e
2e
6e
 
Fig. 2. A social trust network 
Suppose that there are N  trust paths from expert ie  to expert je , and their trust values 
are 
1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }Nij ij ijs s s , a representative trust value sij is obtained by aggregating the N existing trust 
degrees between si and sj. The Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operator [65] has been widely 
adopted in the aggregation processes underlying GDM problems, which allows to flexibly reflect 
different (Optimistic/Pessimistic) aggregation attitudes. Without loss of generality, the OWA 
operator is utilized to calculate the aggregated trust value from expert ie  to je : 
1 2 ( )
1
( ,  ,  ...,  )  
NN k
ij ij ij ij k ijk
s OWA s s s s
=
= =                   (4) 
where 
( )k
ijs

 is the k th largest value in 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }Nij ij ijs s s , and 1 2( , ,..., )
T
N   =  denotes the 
weight vector such that 0k   and 1 1
N
kk

=
= . 
In [66], a widely known approach was presented to determine the OWA weights 
1 2( , ,..., )
T
N   = . A quantifier-guided method based on the use of linguistic quantifiers Q and 
proposed by Yager in [67], is adopted in this work. The weights i are computed by the following 
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formula:  
1( ) ( )i ii N NQ Q
−= − , 1,2,...,i N= ,                     (5) 
where ( )Q c  can be represented as 
                     
0 ,  ,
( )  ,  ,
1 ,  ,
c a
c a
Q c a c b
b a
c b


−
=  
−

                         (6) 
with ,  ,  [0,1]a b c . 
The linguistic quantifiers all, most, at least half and as many as possible, are often utilized in 
the literature. Their parameters a  are 0, 0.3, 0, and 0.5, respectively; and their parameters b  
are 1, 0.8, 0.5, and 1, respectively. 
Example 3: Suppose that six experts 
1 2 6{ ,  ,  ...,  }e e e  established a number of social trust 
relationships with each other, as illustrated in Fig. 2, with the following sociometric S : 
0.7 0.8
0.9
0.8
0.6 0.7
1
0.9
S
− − − − 
 
− − − − − 
 − − − − −
=  
− − − − 
 − − − − −
  − − − − − 
 
In Fig. 2, there is at least one trust path between every pair of experts. However, some pairs 
of experts are not directly connected. In other words, the sociometric associated with Fig. 2 is not 
complete. For example, there is no direct trust link from 1e  to 3e . However, we observe that 
there are two different paths forming an indirect linkage from 
1e  to 3e : 1e → 2e → 3e  and 
1e → 5e → 4e → 3e . According to formula (3), we can propagate trust and infer the following 
trust value from 
1e  to 3e . 
(1) 113 12 23( ,  ) (0.7,  0.9) 0.612s T s s T= = = ; 
(2) 213 15 54 43( ,  ,  ) (0.8,  1, 0.6) 0.444s T s s s T= = = ; 
In this example, the OWA operator with the linguistic quantifier “most” is used to fuse the 
trust values in different trust paths. The aggregated trust value from 
1e  to 3e  can be computed 
using Eq. (4): 
1 2
13 13 13( ,  ) (0.612,  0.444) 0.4 0.612 0.6 0.444 0.511s OWA s s OWA= = =  +  = . 
Similarly, the other unknown trust values can be estimated, which results in a completely 
defined sociometric denoted by ES: 
0.7 0.8
0.9
0.8
0.6 0.7
1
0.9
ES
− 
 
− 
 −
=  
− 
 −
  − 
0.511 0.8 0.42
0.617 0.459 0.459 0.706
0.706 0.454 0.533 0.533
0.472 0.288 0.344
0.472 0.288 0.31 0.546
0.612 0.439 0.706 0.706
. 
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Based on S and ES , a complete sociometric (denoted as ( )ij m mCS cs = ) can be provided by 
experts. When providing ( )ij m mCS cs = , we suggest that ijcs  should be close to ijs  if ijs  is 
unknown in S; otherwise ij ijcs s= . 
2.4. Obtaining the expert's weights from the SNA 
Let ( )ij m mS s =  be the complete sociometric associated with a specific social trust network, 
then the relative node in-degree centrality index, associated with an expert 
ke E, can be 
computed as below: 
1, 
1
( )
1
m
k ik
i i k
C e s
m = 
=
−
                              (7) 
Obviously, the larger ( )kC e  value indicates the higher importance degree of expert ke , as a 
result of a higher overall degree of trust in ke  by the rest of experts in the group. Following this 
idea, the weight of expert ke  can be defined as below. 
Let 
1 2{ ( ),  ( ),  ...,  ( )}mC e C e C e  be the set of in-degree centrality indexes associated with a 
group of experts 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }mE e e e= . The weight of expert ke , k , can be determined by: 
1
( )
( )
k
k m
ki
C e
C e

=
=

                                (8) 
3. The consensus reaching framework based on social network analysis 
This section presents a model for supporting CRPs in MAGDM problems under the presence 
of non-cooperative behaviors, along with its integration into a resolution framework based on 
SNA. 
3.1. Consensus reaching problem with non-cooperative behaviors 
As noted in Section 1, there may exist a great deal of non-cooperative behaviors in CRPs. 
Here, we introduce a consensus reaching problem with non-cooperative behaviors in MAGDM 
context. 
In MAGDM, a set of experts 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }mE e e e=  ( 2)m   provide their preferences or 
opinions regarding a set of possible alternatives or solutions 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }nX x x x=  ( 2)n   with 
respect to a group of attributes 1 2{ ,  ,  ...,  }lA a a a=  ( 2)l  . Let 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
m   =  be the 
weight vector over experts E , where 0
k
   ( 1,2,..., )k m=  represents the weight of the expert 
k
e , and 
1
1
m
kk

=
= . Let 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
l
w w w w=  be the associated weight vector over attributes, 
where 0
i
w   ( 1,2,..., )i l=  denotes the weight of the attribute 
i
a , and 
1
1
l
ii
w
=
= . Let 
( ) ( )( )k k
ij n l
V v

=  ( 1,2,..., )k m=  be the multiple attribute decision matrix provided by the expert 
k
e , where ( ) [0,  1]k
ij
v   signifies her/his preference value for the alternative ix  with respect to 
attribute 
j
a . 
In a CRP, the non-cooperative behaviors may be utilized by some experts to pursue their 
interests, which will influence the consensus efficiency. Our interest in the MAGDM decision 
framework considered is, consequently, to assist experts to obtain a consensual collective solution 
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under the presence (and adverse effects) of such non-cooperative behaviors. 
3.2. Proposed consensus reaching framework 
Two processes (or models) are frequently utilized for solving GDM problems [10, 29]: 
consensus process and selection process. The consensus process is often employed to assist 
experts to achieve the predefined consensus level, and the selection process is dedicated to 
produce a collective ranking of the alternatives according to the preferences provided by the 
experts. Inspired by these two processes, the self-management mechanism for coping with 
non-cooperative behaviors reported by Dong et al. [18], and the consensus framework based on 
the trust relationship among experts presented by Wu et al. [55], we propose a novel consensus 
reaching framework: SNA-based consensus reaching framework, that comprehensively integrates 
behavior management and social trust information in the decision process. The implementation of 
the SNA-based consensus reaching framework deals with a four-stage procedure, whose main 
stages are graphically presented in Fig. 3. 
(1) Generating the experts’ weights from a social trust network 
In this process, the weights of experts are generated from the social trust network. In the 
initial round (i.e., 0z = ) of the CRP, the sociometric (i.e., S) associated with the social trust 
network is often incomplete, and to generate a complete sociometric (i.e., CS) associated with S is 
critical. In the proposed consensus reaching framework, the trust propagation and aggregation 
method presented in section 2 is utilized to infer the unknown trust values in the sociometric, and 
an estimated sociometric (i.e., ES) is then yielded. The estimated sociometric ES can be directly 
treated as the CS, which will not change the essence of the proposed consensus reaching 
framework. In order to increase the flexibility of the proposed consensus reaching framework, this 
study assumes that CS is provided by experts using ES as the reference social information. Then, 
the approach proposed in section 2 is adopted to generate the experts’ weights from CS. In 
subsequent rounds of the CRP (i.e., 1z  ), the experts update their trust values with respect to 
other experts (based on the non-cooperative behaviors detected). Thus, both the complete 
sociometric and weights of experts derived from it change dynamically during the CRP.  
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Fig. 3. The SNA-based consensus reaching framework 
(2) Consensus process 
Two main steps are normally involved in the consensus process: consensus measure and 
feedback adjustment [39, 40]. 
(i) Consensus measure 
In this step, a consensus measure method is devised to compute the consensus level among 
the experts by taking their importance weights into account. 
Let  , ( ) ( )( )k kij n lV v =  and 
( ) ( )( )c cij n lV v =  be as above. Several consensus measurement 
methods have been reported (e.g., [9, 25]) to calculate the level of consensus in the CRP. Here, we 
utilize the consensus measure proposed in [42]. The basic idea of this consensus measure method 
is that we first compute the similarity levels between each pair of experts regarding their 
preference values or assessments. Then, a consensus matrix is calculated by aggregating these 
obtained similarity levels. Based on the consensus matrix, the consensus levels on the preference 
values, the consensus levels on alternatives, and the group consensus level can be generated. 
Let ( ) ( )( )kh khij n lSM sm =  ( 1,2,..., 1k m= − , 1, +2,...,h k k m= + ) be the preference similarity 
matrix, where ( ) [0,1]khijsm   represents the similarity level between experts ke  and he  in their 
preference values ( )kijv  and 
( )h
ijv , and 
( )kh
ijsm  is determined by: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 | |kh k hij ij ijsm v v= − − .                           (9) 
Let ( )ij n lCM cm =  be the consensus matrix, where ijcm  is the collective consensus level 
regarding the preference value ijv , and it is computed by: 
1 ( )
1 +1
1
1 +1
m m kh
kh ijk h k
ij m m
khk h k
sm
cm


−
= =
−
= =

=
 
 
,                        (10) 
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where [0,  1]kh   can be determined by min( , )kh k h  =  (see [42]). 
Based on ( )ij n nCM cm = , the consensus levels are defined at three levels: 
(a) Consensus level on the preference value ijv , ij ijcp cm= .  
(b) Consensus level on alternative ix , 
1
l
ijj
i
cm
ca
l
=
=

. 
(c) Group consensus level, 
1
n
ii
ca
cl
n
==

.                                  (11) 
It is clear that [0,  1]cl . In particular, 1cl =  means that there is a full consensus among 
experts. Otherwise, a larger cl  value indicates a higher consensus level among experts. In the 
CRP, a consensus threshold [0,  1]   is often defined. If cl  , the consensus level among 
experts is acceptable; otherwise, the feedback adjustment process is utilized to assist experts in 
modifying their preferences.  
Example 4: Let (1) (1)
3 3( )ijV v = , 
(2) (2)
3 3( )ijV v = , and 
(3) (3)
3 3( )ijV v =  be three decision 
matrices provided by experts 1e , 2e  and 3e , respectively. The weight vector over the three 
experts is (0.2,  0.3,  0.5)T = . 
 
Table 2: 
( )kV  ( 1,2,3)k =  in Example 4 
 (1)V   
(2)V   
(3)V  
 1a  2a  3a   1a  2a  3a   1a  2a  3a  
1x  0.3 0.4 0.5  0.5 0.6 0.5  0.5 0.6 0.7 
2x  0.6 0.7 0.5  0.6 0.8 0.7  0.8 0.8 0.8 
3x  0.4 0.5 0.6  0.5 0.6 0.6  0.6 0.6 0.8 
The three preference similarity matrices (1,2) (1,2) 3 3( )ijSM sm = , 
(1,3) (1,3)
3 3( )ijSM sm = , and 
(2,3) (2,3)
3 3( )ijSM sm =  can be generated based on Eq. (9). For example, 
(1,2) (1) (2)
11 11 111 | |sm v v= − − =  
1 | 0.3 0.5 | 0.8− − = . 
Then, the consensus matrix 3 3( )ijCM cm =  can be generated. For example, 11cm  can be 
computed by: 
(1,2) (1,3) (2,3)
12 11 13 11 23 11
11
12 13 23
+ + 0.2 0.8+0.2 0.8+0.3 1
0.886
+ + 0.2+0.2+0.3
sm sm sm
cm
  
  
     
= = = . 
Similarly, we can obtain 
12 0.886cm = , 13 0.857cm = , 21 0.857cm = , 22 0.843cm = , 
23 0.814cm = , 31 0.871cm = , 32 0.843cm = , and 33 0.857cm = . 
Next, ijcp  is computed by ij ijcp cm=  ( , 1,2,3)i j = . Based on 1
l
i ijj
ca cm l
=
=  obtains  
the consensus levels on the three alternatives, and they are 
1 0.876ca = , 2 0.871ca = , and 
3 0.89ca = , respectively. 
The group consensus level among the three experts is computed by: 
1 0.876 0.871 0.89 0.879
3
n
ii
ca
cl
n
= + += = =

. 
(ii) Feedback adjustment 
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If the predefined consensus level among experts is not achieved, the feedback adjustment 
process is employed to assist experts to update their decision matrices for increasing the consensus 
level among experts. The core idea of the feedback adjustment process is to obtain and provide the 
group decision matrix, which is obtained from the individual decision matrices using a weighted 
averaging aggregation operator, to experts to reconsider constructing new decision matrices. 
Let ( ) ( )( )group groupij n lV v =  be the group decision matrix, where 
( )c
ijv  can be yielded as 
follows: 
( ) ( )
1
m
group k
ij k ij
k
v v
=
=                             (12) 
Let ( ) ( )( )k kij n lV v =  be the adjusted decision matrix associated with 
( ) ( )( )k kij n lV v = . When 
providing ( ) ( )( )k kij n lV v = , it is generally advised that the experts adjust their assessments so as to 
bring them closer to the collective preference, i.e.: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[min( , ),  max( , )]k k group k groupij ij ij ij ijv v v v v                      (13) 
Example 5: Let (1) (1)
3 3( )ijV v = , 
(2) (2)
3 3( )ijV v = , 
(3) (3)
3 3( )ijV v =  and (0.2,  0.3,  0.5)
T =  be 
as in Example 4. 
Using Eq. (12) obtains the group decision matrix, which is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3: 
( )groupV  in Example 5 
 1a  2a  3a  
1x  0.46 0.56 0.6 
2x  0.7 0.78 0.71 
3x  0.53 0.58 0.7 
Then, 
( )groupV  is provided for the three experts to construct new decision matrices, 
( ) ( )
3 3( )
k k
ijV v =  ( 1,2,3)k = . For example, when providing 
(1)
11v  , it is advised that 
(1) (1) ( ) (1) ( )
11 11 11 11 11[min( , ),  max( , )] [0.3,  0.46]
group groupv v v v v = . 
Simultaneously, the results from the non-cooperative behaviors analysis module (described in 
detail in Section 4) are provided for experts to modify their trust values regarding other experts. In 
particular, if an expert adopts non-cooperative behavior(s), then other experts will decrease the 
trust values with respect to this expert. 
(3) Non-cooperative behavior analysis 
In this stage, the behaviors of experts upon the preference adjustment via feedback are 
analyzed. The results of the behavior analysis are subsequently provided for experts to modify 
their trust relationships before a new consensus round is initiated. In particular, if an expert is 
deemed as adopting non-cooperative behavior(s), other experts are suggested to decrease the trust 
values of this expert in the social trust network. 
The detailed process to analyze non-cooperative behaviors is provided in section 4. 
(4) Selection process 
Once the predefined consensus level among experts is reached, the selection process is 
conducted to generate the final collective ranking of alternatives. 
Let ( )ij n lV v =  be a decision matrix. Applying the weighted averaging (WA) operator to fuse 
all the preference values in the ith row of ( )ij n lV v = , the evaluation value of the alternative ix , 
14 
 
iEV , can be generated, that is 
1
l
i j ij
j
EV w v
=
=                               (14) 
where [0,  1]jw   is the weight over the attribute ja . 
Further, based on iEV  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )i n= , the preference ordering 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nO o o o=  can 
be obtained to rank alternatives from the best to the worst one, where 
io j=                                 (15) 
if iEV  is the jth largest value in 1 2{ , ,  ...,  }nEV EV EV . 
We can get the collective preference ordering from 
( )groupV  applying Eq. (15), which is denoted 
as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
group group group group T
nO o o o= . In addition, the preference ordering derived from 
( )kV  
is denoted as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
k k k k T
nO o o o= , which will be used for detecting some types of 
non-cooperative behaviors. 
Example 6: Let the attribute weight vector be (0.3,  0.4,  0.3)
Tw = . Employing Eq. (14) 
yields 
1 0.542EV = , 2 0.735EV = , and 3 0.601EV = . Further, the preference ordering over the 
three alternatives is produced, that is (3,  1,  2)
TO = . 
In the following, we present a flowchart and an algorithm to describe the SNA-based CRP. 
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Fig. 4. Flowchart of the proposed SNA-based consensus framework 
 
Table 4: SNA-based consensus reaching algorithm 
Input: 
( ) ( )( )k kij n lV v =  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m= , ( )ij m mS s = , 1 2( , ,..., )
T
lw w w w= ,  , and max 1z  . 
Output: The adjusted decision matrices 
( ) ( )( )k kij n lV v =  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m= , the adjusted sociometric 
( )ij m mS s = , the number of iterations Z , and the final collective preference ordering 
( )cO =  
( ) ( ) ( )
1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
c c c T
no o o . 
Step 1: Let 0z = , ( , ) ( )k z kV V= . Applying the trust propagation and aggregation method, we can 
estimate the unknown trust values, and they are used as references for constructing complete sociometric. 
The complete sociometric is denoted as 
( ) ( )( )z zij m mS s =  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m= . 
Step 2: Apply Eq. (8) to generate the experts’ weights 1, 2, ,( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
z z z m z   = , where 
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( )
1, 
, ( )
1 1, 
m z
iki i k
k z m m z
ikk i i k
s
s
 = 
= = 
=

 
. 
Step 3: Using Eq. (11) provides the consensus level among experts zcl . If zcl   
or 
maxz z , go 
to Step 6; otherwise, continue with the next step. 
Step 4: Employing Eq. (12) yields the collective decision matrix ( , ) ( , )( )c z c zij n lV v = , where 
( , ) ( , )
,1
mc z k z
ij k z ijk
v v
=
= . When constructing ( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n lV v+ + =  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m= , experts are advised to 
adjust their preferences, such that  ( , 1) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )[min( , ),max( , )]k z k z c z k z c zij ij ij ij ijv v v v v
+  . 
Step 5: The non-cooperative behavior analysis module is conducted to analyze the behaviors of the 
experts. Based on this, experts update their trust relationships. As a result, a new sociometric is 
constructed, which is denoted as ( 1) ( 1)( )z zij m mS s
+ +
=  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m= . 
Let 1z z= + , then go to Step 2. 
Step 6: Let 
( ) ( , )k k zV V= , 
( )zS S= , and Z z= . Based on Eq. (12), the final collective decision matrix 
( )cV  can be generated from 
(1) (2) ( ){ ,  ,  ...,  }mV V V . Applying selection process offers the final collective 
preference ordering 
( )cO  from 
( )cV . Output the adjusted decision matrices 
( ) ( )( )k kij n lV v = , the 
sociometric ( )ij m mS s = , the number of consensus rounds Z , and the final collective preference ordering 
( )cO . 
 
4. Non-cooperative behavior analysis 
In the CRP, it is common that some experts adopt non-cooperative behaviors to further their 
own interests. In this section, several common non-cooperative behaviors of experts are analyzed 
in detail. 
Let ( , ) ( , )( )k z k zij n lV v =  be a decision matrix given by the expert ke  in consensus round z , and 
let 
( , ) ( , )( )c z c zij n lV v =  be the collective decision matrix in consensus round z . In the following, we 
define three types of non-cooperative behaviors: dishonest, disobedient, and divergent behaviors. 
(1) Dishonest behavior 
In the CRP, it is not unusual that some experts will give opinions or preferences regarding 
alternatives dishonestly. In particular, the evaluation on the alternatives that are preferred by the 
group may be systematically decreased by an expert in the CRP, which is a common dishonest 
behavior.  
The basic idea to identify a dishonest behavior is below:  
The most preferred alternatives of the group are firstly identified. Then, the similarity level 
between each individual and the group is calculated regarding these identified alternatives. If the 
similarity level of an expert is small enough, then this expert exhibits a dishonest behavior.  
Following this idea, the dishonest behavior is formally defined below. 
Definition 2: The preference ordering 1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
nO o o o=  can be equally represented using 
a matrix ( )ij n nT t = , where 
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1,   
0,   
0.5,
i j
ij i j
i j
o o
t o o
o o
 

= 

=
. 
Let 1, 2, ,( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
z z z n zY y y y=  be a vector, where , 1i zy =  if ix  is among the most preferred 
alternatives by the group at round z; otherwise , 0i zy = . Without loss of generality, zY  can be 
obtained using the following assignment: 
( , )
,
1,  ( )
0,
group z
i
i z
if o round n
y
otherwise
  
= 

,                       (16) 
where 
( , )group z
io  is the group ranking position of alternative ix  in consensus round z , and 
[0,  1]   is a parameter to distinguish the most preferred alternatives by the group (the lower its 
value, the more restrictively the parameter behaves) and round is the usual rounding operator. 
Let 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
k z k z k z k z T
nO o o o=  be the preference ordering associated with respect to ke  
in consensus round z . Let 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 2( ,  ,  ...,  )
group z group z group z group z T
nO o o o=  be the group preference 
ordering in consensus round z , where ( , )group zio  is the group ranking position alternative ix . Let 
( , ) ( , )( )k z k zij n nT t =  and 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )group z group zij n nT t
− −
=  be two matrices generated from 
( , )k zO  and 
( , 1)group zO − , respectively, according to Definition 2. 
Let 
( , ) ( , 1)
, 11 1,( , )
1
, 11
| |
1
( 1)
n n k z group z
i z ij iji j j ik z
n
i zi
y t t
NS
n y
−
−= = 
−=
−
= −
−
 

.                   (17) 
Clearly, 
( , )
1 [0,1]
k zNS  . A smaller 
( , )
1
k zNS  value is deemed a stronger indicator that a higher 
probability of expert ke  exhibits dishonest behavior. Let 1  1( [0,1])   be a parameter, 
which is utilized to ascertain whether an expert features the dishonest behavior. If 
( , )
1 1
k zNS  , we 
infer that expert ke  exhibits a dishonest behavior in consensus round z . 
Below, an example, i.e., Example 7, is presented for better understanding the identification 
of dishonest behaviors. 
Example 7: Let (1, 1) (1, 1)
6 3( )
z z
ijV v
− −
=  be the decision matrix provided by expert 1e  in 
consensus round 1z − , and let ( , 1) ( , 1)
6 3( )
group z group z
ijV v
− −
=  be the collective decision matrix in 
consensus round 1z − . (1, 1)zV −  and ( , 1)group zV −  are provided below: 
Table 5: 
(1, 1)zV −  and 
( , 1)group zV −  in Example 7 
 (1, 1)zV −   
( , 1)group zV −  
 1a  2a  3a   1a  2a  3a  
1x  0.3 0.4 0.5  0.5 0.6 0.7 
2x  0.6 0.75 0.5  0.8 0.85 0.68 
3x  0.5 0.45 0.35  0.7 0.65 0.55 
4x  0.45 0.55 0.6  0.8 0.75 0.82 
5x  0.55 0.4 0.6  0.9 0.65 0.8 
6x  0.45 0.45 0.6  0.65 0.65 0.8 
Suppose that expert 1e  expresses his/her adjusted decision matrix 
(1, )zV  as: 
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Table 6: 
(1, )zV  in Example 7 
 1a  2a  3a  
1x  0.48 0.58 0.7 
2x  0.75 0.8 0.6 
3x  0.68 0.65 0.53 
4x  0.47 0.56 0.62 
5x  0.6 0.5 0.65 
6x  0.6 0.65 0.75 
Applying Eq. (15) yields the preference ordering 
( , 1) (6,  3,  5,  1,  2,  4)group z TO − =  from 
( , 1)group zV − . When setting 0.3 = , we have 1 (0,  0,  0,  1,  1,  0)
T
zY − = . Meanwhile, according to Eq. 
(15), we have 
(1, ) (4,  1,  3,  6,  5,  2)z TO = . Further, we can obtain (1, )2 0
zNS = , according to Eq. 
(17).  
In this example, if we set 1 0.5 = , we will infer that expert 1e  shows a dishonest behavior 
because 
(1, )
1 1
zNS  , because despite having updated preferences towards the collective opinion, 
the least preferred alternatives by the group have been adjusted more strongly. This intuitively 
affects the updated preference ordering O(1,z). 
(2) Disobedient behavior 
To achieve the predefined consensus level among experts, experts are required to change 
their preferences or opinions according to the suggestions generated from the feedback adjustment 
process. However, to pursue their interests, some experts may modify their preferences or 
opinions to a very low extent, or even in the opposite direction as recommended. In this paper, this 
type of behavior is referred as disobedient behavior. 
The basic idea to identify a disobedient behavior is below: 
Firstly, the actual adjustment distance of each expert in the CRP is computed. Then, the total 
adjustment distance of each expert to achieve a full consensus is generated. Next, the adjustment 
proportion to which each expert changes his/her opinions and shifts them closer to consensus, 
based on the suggestion received, is produced. If the adjustment proportion of an expert is smaller 
than an expected minimum value, then this expert exhibits a disobedient behavior.  
In the following, we formally define disobedient behavior. 
Let 
( , ) ( , 1) ( , ) ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , 1)
( , ) ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , ) ( , 1)
( , ) ( , -1)
| |,    if [min( , ),  max( , )]
,       if    
k z k z k z k z group z k z group z
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
k z k z k z group z k z k z
ij ij ij ij ij ij
k z k z
ij ij
v v v v v v v
v v v v and v v
f v
− − − − −
− − − −
− 
−  
= − ( , ) ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , ) ( , 1)
( , 1) ( , ) ( , 1) ( , 1) ( , ) ( , 1)
( , ) ( , 1) ( , 1) (
,        if    
,   if    
,   if  
k z k z group z k z k z
ij ij ij ij ij
group z k z k z group z k z group z
ij ij ij ij ij ij
k z group z k z gro
ij ij ij ij
v v v and v v
v v v v and v v
v v v v
− − −
− − − −
− −
 
−  
−  , 1) ( , ) ( , 1)  up z k z group zij ijand v v
− −









,     (18) 
where ( , )k zijf  reflects the situation that the expert ke  modifies his/her preference value regarding 
the alternative ix  with respect to attribute ja . In particular, this indicates that the expert 
modifies his/her preference value in the opposite recommended direction if ( , ) 0k zijf  . 
Let 
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( , ) ( , )
1 1
n l
k z k z
ij
i j
AD f
= =
=                          (19) 
and 
( , ) ( , 1) ( , 1)
1 1
| |
n l
k z k z group z
ij ij
i j
D v v− −
= =
= −                      (20) 
where ( , )k zAD  signifies the total adjustment distance of expert ke  with respect to all of the 
elements ijv  ( 1,2,..., ;  1,2,..., )i n j l= = , and 
( , )k zD  represents the total adjustment distance of 
expert ke  to achieve a full consensus on all of the elements ijv  ( 1,2,..., ;  1,2,..., )i n j l= = . 
Let 
( , )
( , )
2 ( , )
k z
k z
k z
AD
NS
D
= .                               (21) 
The value of 
( , )
2
k zNS  signifies the adjustment proportion to which expert ke  changes 
his/her opinions and brings them closer to consensus, based on the suggestions received. Clearly, a 
smaller 
( , )
2
k zNS  value stands for a stronger indicator that expert ke  exhibits disobedient 
behavior. Let 2  2( [0,1])   be a parameter, which is used to check whether an expert features 
the disobedient behavior. If 
( , )
2 2
k zNS  , we infer that expert ke  meets the feature of the 
disobedient behavior in consensus round z . 
Example 8: Let (1, 1) (1, 1)
3 3( )
z z
ijV v
− −
=  be the decision matrix provided by expert 1e  in 
consensus round 1z − , and let ( , 1) ( , 1) 3 3( )
group z group z
ijV v
− −
=  be the group decision matrix in 
consensus round 1z − . (1, 1)zV −  and ( , 1)group zV −  are provided below: 
Table 7: 
(1, 1)zV −  and 
( , 1)group zV −  in example 8 
 ( , 1)k zV −   
( , 1)group zV −  
 1a  2a  3a   1a  2a  3a  
1x  0.7 0.5 0.55  0.55 0.65 0.65 
2x  0.8 0.65 0.62  0.55 0.75 0.5 
3x  0.85 0.72 0.9  0.65 0.9 0.65 
We assume that expert 1e  provides the adjusted decision matrix 
(1, )zV  as follows: 
Table 8: 
(1, )zV in example 8 
 1a  2a  3a  
1x  0.6 0.55 0.5 
2x  0.9 0.68 0.52 
3x  0.68 0.88 0.7 
Applying Eq. (18) yields 
(1, )
11 0.1
zf = , 
(1, )
12 0.05
zf = , 
(1, )
13 0.05
zf = − , 
(1, )
21 0.1
zf = − , 
(1, )
22 0.03
zf = , 
(1, )
23 0.1
zf = , 
(1, )
31 0.17
zf = , 
(1, )
32 0.16
zf =  and 
(1, )
33 0.2
zf = . Applying Eqs. (19) and (20) 
yields (1, ) 0.66zAD =  and (1, ) 1.5zD = , respectively. Further, utilizing Eq. (21) leads to 
(1, )
2 0.44
zNS = . 
Here, if we set 2 0.5 = , we will infer that expert 1e  moderately exhibits a disobedient 
19 
 
behavior pattern, because 
(1, )
2 2
zNS  . 
(3) Divergent behavior 
In the CRP, experts’ preferences or opinions will achieve a consensus if they change their 
decision matrices according to the suggestion of feedback adjustment. However, an expert’s 
decision matrix may diverge from the remainder of the experts. In this paper, this type of behavior 
is referred as divergent behavior. 
The basic idea to define divergent behavior is below: 
The distances between all pairs of experts are computed. If the distance between two experts 
is small enough, then they are considered as neighbors. Following this, the neighbors of each 
expert can be identified. If an individual has fewer neighbors, that is to say, the proportion of 
his/her neighbors is too small, then this expert exhibits divergent behavior. 
In the following, we formally define divergent behavior. 
Let 
( , ) ( , )
( ) 1, ( , )
0,
i z j z
z
ij
d V V
d
otherwise
 
= 

                        (22) 
where [0,  1]   is a parameter, and 
( , ) ( , )( , )i z j zd V V  is computed by: 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
1 1
1
( , ) | |
n l
i z j z i z j z
pq pq
p q
d V V v v
n l = =
= −

 .                 (23) 
Clearly, 
ie  and je  are neighbors if 
( ) 0zijd = . 
Let 
( , ) ( )
3
1
1
=1
1
m
k z z
kj
j
NS d
m =
−
−
                            (24) 
Clearly, ( , )
3 [0,  1]
k zNS   reflects the proportion of neighbors associated with ke . Let 3  
3( [0,1])   be the predefined parameter to check divergent behavior. If 
( , )
3 3
k zNS  , we infer 
that expert ke  meets the feature of the divergent behavior. 
Example 9: Let 
(1, )zV  be as in Example 8. Let (2, )zV , (3, )zV  and (4, )zV  be three 
decision matrices associated with experts 2e , 3e , and 4e , respectively, in consensus round z , 
which are listed in Table 9. 
Table 9: Decision matrices 
( , )k zV  ( 2,  3,  4)k = in Example 9 
 (2, )zV   (3, )zV   (4, )zV  
 1a  2a  3a   1a  2a  3a   1a  2a  3a  
1x  0.65 0.6 0.55  0.63 0.59 0.52  0.2 0.25 0.9 
2x  0.85 0.72 0.5  0.88 0.7 0.55  0.45 0.4 0.95 
3x  0.65 0.9 0.68  0.7 0.85 0.72  0.92 0.23 0.4 
Based on Eq. (23), we can obtain that 
(1, ) (2, )( , ) 0.037z zd V V = , 
(1, ) (3, )( ,  ) 0.034z zd V V = , 
(1, ) (4, )( ,  ) 0.383z zd V V = , 
(2, ) (3, )( ,  ) 0.033z zd V V = , 
(2, ) (4, )( ,  ) 0.393z zd V V = , and 
(3, ) (4, )( ,  ) 0.382z zd V V = . When setting 0.35 = , we have (1, )3 2 3
zNS = , (2, )3 2 3
zNS = , 
20 
 
(3, )
3 2 3
zNS = , and 
(4, )
3 0
zNS = , according to Eq. (24). If we set 3 0.6 = , then we will infer that 
expert 4e  exhibits a divergent behavior because 
(4, )
3 30
zNS =  . 
Note 1: The parameter   utilized in Eq. (16) is used to distinguish the most preferred 
alternatives by the group when analyzing the dishonest behavior, and parameter   appeared in 
Eq. (22) is used a threshold to judge whether the diverge degree between two experts is large 
enough when analyzing the divergent behavior. The parameters 1 , 2 , and 3  are used as 
thresholds to deduce whether experts’ behaviors satisfy the characteristics of being dishonest, 
disobedient, and divergent behaviors, respectively. Smaller 1 , 2 , and 3  values indicate the 
stricter criteria to deduce dishonest, disobedient, and divergent behaviors, respectively. According 
to the specific decision problem and situation at hand, the experts can set  ,  , 1 , 2 , and 
3  values. When using the appropriate parameter settings in a given situation, the proposed 
consensus framework is effective for managing non-cooperative behaviors, as shown in the 
following simulation experiments and comparison analysis. 
Note 2: The proposed consensus reaching framework is a general consensus reaching 
framework, characterized by its ability for dealing with different types of non-cooperative 
behaviors. The main reason to define the above different types of non-cooperative behaviors is to 
provide quantitative indexes to analyze the experts’ non-cooperative behaviors, which will provide 
a decision support for experts to modify their trust values regarding other experts in the social trust 
network. The three types of non-cooperative behaviors are focused on different aspects: (1) 
dishonest behavior analysis is focused on whether the evaluation of the alternatives that are 
preferred by the group is systematically decreased by an expert in the CRP, (2) disobedient 
behavior analysis is focused on whether an expert modify their preferences or opinions to a very 
low extent, or even in the opposite recommended direction, (3) divergent behavior analysis is 
focused on whether an expert’s preference diverges from remainder of the experts as the CRP 
progresses. It should be noted that in some situations, an expert may have multiple types of 
non-cooperative behaviors, and in this situation our consensus reaching framework is still valid to 
effectively identify and manage such behaviors.  
 
5. Illustrative example 
To show the applicability of the SNA-based consensus reaching framework in a real-life 
MAGDM problem, an illustrative example is provided in this section. In this example, we assume 
that a set of eight experts 1 2 8{ ,  ,  ...,  }E e e e= , a set of four alternatives 1 2 3 4{ ,  ,  ,  }X x x x x= , and a 
set of four attributes 1 2 3 4{ ,  ,  ,  }A a a a a=  are involved. Here, we assume that all criteria are 
equally important, i.e. (0.25,  0.25,  0.25,  0.25)Tw = . The decision matrices 
( ) ( )
4 4( )
k k
ijV v =  
( 1,  2,  ...,  8)k =  provided by experts ke  are listed in Tables 10-13.  
Table 10: Decision matrices 
(1)V  and (2)V  
 (1)V   (2)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.587 0.447 0.172 0.493  0.375 0.573 0.299 0.296 
2x  0.616 0.557 0.865 0.374  0.1 0.253 0.12 0.394 
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3x  0.591 0.951 0.439 0.221  0.346 0.585 0.156 0.078 
4x  0.237 0.689 0.377 0.757  0.832 1 0.699 0.598 
Table 11: Decision matrices 
(3)V  and (4)V  
 (3)V   (4)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.202 0.017 0.396 0.534 
 0.032 0.693 0.73 0.469 
2x  0.858 0.852 0.498 0.095 
 0.087 0.929 0.449 0.757 
3x  0.615 0.149 0.67 0.824 
 0.245 0.116 0.442 0.334 
4x  0.239 0.332 0.661 0.061 
 0.983 0.141 0.828 0.511 
Table 12: Decision matrices 
(5)V  and (6)V  
 (5)V   (6)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.81 0.937 0.084 0.625 
 0.58 0.365 0.026 0.074 
2x  0.338 0.507 0.014 0.309 
 0.478 0.94 0.479 0.402 
3x  0.235 0.061 0.749 0.643 
 0.091 0.913 0.962 0.105 
4x  0.815 0.424 0.957 0.831 
 0.784 0.659 0.571 0.396 
Table 13: Decision matrices 
(7)V  and (8)V  
 (7)V   (8)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.837 0.837 0.174 0.597  0.277 0.465 0.116 0.002 
2x  0.837 0.259 0.455 0.149  0.526 0.703 0.978 0.915 
3x  0.039 0.188 0.443 0.275  0.716 0.857 0.848 0.657 
4x  0.56 0.026 0.368 0.902  0.493 0.28 0.094 0.215 
Meanwhile, the social trust network among the eight experts is as follows: 
6e
1e
2e
8e
7e
4e 5e
3e
 
The sociometric, S , associated with the social trust network is provided below: 
0.92 0.95 0.86
0.95 0.85 0.9
1 1
0.95 0.9
0.94 0.93 0.95
0.93 0.98
0.96 0.87 0.94
0.87 0.92
S
− − − − − 
 
− − − − − 
 − − − − − −
 
− − − − − − 
=  − − − − −
 
− − − − − − 
 
− − − − − 
 − − − − − − 
. 
In this example, we set 0.9 = . In the following, we use the proposed consensus reaching 
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model to help the eight experts achieve a consensus. 
(1) In the initial stage of the CRP, the trust propagation and aggregation method presented in 
section 2 is adopted to help experts produce a complete sociometric, CS , from S . Meanwhile, 
the weight vector of the eights experts, 1 2 8( , ,..., )
T   = , is generated from CS . Further, the 
consent level among the eight experts, cl , is yielded. If the consensus level is acceptable, the 
selection process is used to help experts obtain the preference ordering of the four alternatives, 
otherwise, the first round of the CRP is initiated. 
(i) Generating complete sociometric 
In the trust aggregation process, the OWA operator with the linguistic quantifier “most” is 
used to fuse the trust values in different trust paths, and the trust paths with the length larger than 
or equal to 4 are not taken into account. By using the trust propagation and aggregation method, 
the unknown trust values in S  can be estimated, which are listed in the matrix ES . 
0.92 0.95 0.86
0.95 0.85 0.9
1 1
0.95 0.9
0.94 0.93 0.95
0.93 0.98
0.9
ES
−
−
−
−
=
−
−
0.795 0.763 0.835 0.78
0.75 0.771 0.76 0.84
0.95 0.86 0.81 0.777 0.94
0.831 0.808 0.82 0.845 0.87
0.814 0.869 0.831 0.85
0.851 0.792 0.814 0.821 0.92
0.793 0.811 0.8 6 0.87 0.94
0.87 0.92
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
− 
 − 
0.77
0.821 0.87 0.74 0.79 0.783
. 
The matrix ES  is used as the reference point for experts to construct a complete 
sociometric, CS , which is provided below: 
0.92 0.82 0.95 0.78 0.86 0.84 0.8
0.95 0.75 0.85 0.9 0.8 0.75 0.8
0.95 1 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.92 1
0.83 0.82 0.82 0.95 0.9 0.85 0.9
0.82 0.88 0.94 0.93 0.83 0.85 0.95
0.93 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.82 0.98 0.92
0.81 0.8 0.8 0.96 0.87 0.77 0.94
0.83 0.87
CS
−
−
−
−
=
−
−
−
0.87 0.82 0.75 0.81 0.92
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 − 
. 
(ii) Producing the weights of the eight experts 
Using the method presented in section 2.4, we can obtain the weights of the eight experts 
from CS . Specifically, Eq. (7) is first used to generate the node in-degree centrality indexes (i.e., 
1( )C e  ,…, 8( )C e ) of the eight experts. Further, based on Eq. (8), the weights of experts can be 
yielded from the obtained in-degree centrality indexes of the eight experts, which are 1 0.127 = , 
2 0.127 = , 3 0.12 = , 4 0.128 = , 5 0.122 = , 6 0.12 = , 7 0.126 = , and 8 0.13 = . 
(iii) Consensus measure 
Applying the consensus measure method proposed in section 3.2, the consensus level among 
the eight experts can be produced. First, the consensus matrix ( )ij n nCM cm =  can be produced 
from 
(1)V - (8)V  based on Eq. (10). Then, the consensus level on the preference value ijv  is 
obtained using formula ij ijcp cm= . Following this, the consensus level on alternative ix  can be 
yielded based on formula 
1
l
i ijj
ca cm l
=
= . Finally, the consensus level among the eight experts 
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can be generated based on the formula 
1
n
ii
cl ca n
=
= , which is 0.66cl = . 
Due to 0.66cl =  , the first consensus round is initiated to assist experts to achieve a 
consensus. 
(2) First consensus round 
In the first consensus round, the feedback suggestions for decision matrices modifying are 
yielded. Based on them, the new decision matrices 
( , 1)kV  associated with ( )kV  ( 1,2,...,8)k =  
are provided. Moreover, in this consensus round, the sociometric remains unchanged. Following 
this, the consensus level among the eight experts is measured. If the consensus level is acceptable, 
the selection process is used to help experts obtain the preference ordering of alternatives, 
otherwise, the second round of the CRP is activated. 
(i) Feedback process for decision matrices modifying 
The group decision matrix, 
( )groupV , can be generated using Eq. (12), which is listed in Table 
14. 
Table 14: Decision matrix 
( )groupV  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.46 0.544 0.252 0.385 
2x  0.478 0.623 0.486 0.43 
3x  0.362 0.480 0.585 0.391 
4x  0.618 0.442 0.566 0.535 
Let 
( ,1) ( ,1)
4 4( )
k k
ijV v =  be the updated decision matrix associated with 
( ) ( )
4 4( )
k k
ijV v = . 
When providing 
( ,1) ( ,1)
4 4( )
k k
ijV v = , we advise that: 
( ,1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[min{ , },  max{ , }]k k group k groupij ij ij ij ijv v v v v . 
With the guidance of adjustment suggestions, the experts expressed their adjusted decision 
matrices 
( ,1) ( ,1)
4 4( )
k k
ijV v =  ( 1,2,...,8)k = , which are shown in Tables 13-16: 
Table 15: Decision matrices (1, 1)V  and (2, 1)V  
 (1, 1)V   (2, 1)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.6 0.4 0.4 0.45  0.4 0.55 0.27 0.3 
2x  0.7 0.57 0.7 0.4  0.25 0.4 0.35 0.4 
3x  0.7 0.45 0.44 0.25  0.35 0.5 0.42 0.25 
4x  0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7  0.7 0.7 0.62 0.54 
Table 16: Decision matrices 
(3, 1)V  and (4, 1)V  
 (3, 1)V   (4, 1)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.3 0.25 0.35 0.4 
 0.25 0.6 0.5 0.4 
2x  0.65 0.7 0.49 0.3 
 0.3 0.75 0.46 0.65 
3x  0.42 0.25 0.6 0.54 
 0.3 0.23 0.5 0.35 
4x  0.35 0.35 0.65 0.5 
 0.85 0.35 0.7 0.52 
Table 17: Decision matrices 
(5, 1)V  and (6, 1)V  
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 (5, 1)V   (5, 1)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.62 0.65 0.15 0.4 
 0.48 0.45 0.24 0.25 
2x  0.42 0.55 0.3 0.35 
 0.478 0.8 0.482 0.41 
3x  0.28 0.38 0.65 0.42 
 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.12 
4x  0.72 0.43 0.8 0.75 
 0.7 0.55 0.57 0.45 
Table 18: Decision matrices 
(7, 1)V  and (8, 1)V  
 (7, 1)V   (8, 1)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.5 0.6 0.23 0.45  0.35 0.49 0.18 0.3 
2x  0.55 0.4 0.46 0.35  0.48 0.63 0.5 0.44 
3x  0.3 0.35 0.55 0.35  0.45 0.55 0.7 0.52 
4x  0.5 0.1 0.39 0.55  0.6 0.42 0.55 0.53 
(ii) Feedback process for sociometric modification 
Let 1S  be sociometric in this first consensus round. We have that 1S CS= . 
(iii) Generating the weights of the eight experts 
Eq. (8) is employed to generate the weights of experts from 1S : 
1 (0.127,  0.127,  0.12,  0.128,  0.122,  0.12,  0.126,  0.13)
T = . 
(iv) Consensus measure 
Employing Eq. (11) offers the consensus level among experts 1 0.844cl = . 
Due to 
1 0.844cl =  , the second consensus round is activated to assist experts to improve 
the consensus level. 
(3) Second consensus round 
In this consensus round, the approach for analyzing non-cooperative behaviors is used to 
analyze the behaviors of the eight experts. Based on the analysis results, a new sociometric, 2S , is 
provided by the experts. Meanwhile, the feedback process for decision matrices modifying is used 
to help experts providing new decision matrices ( , 2)kV  ( 1,2,...,8)k = . Meanwhile, the consensus 
level is generated from 
( , 2)kV  ( 1,2,...,8)k = . If the consensus level is acceptable, the selection 
process is used to help experts obtain a preference ordering over the alternatives, otherwise, the 
third round of CRP is activated. 
(i) Non-cooperative behaviors analysis 
By setting 0.3 = , 0.18 = , the non-cooperative behaviors in the previous consensus 
rounds are analyzed. The results are listed in Table 19. 
Table 19: Non-cooperative behaviors indexes 
 
1e  2e  3e  4e  5e  6e  7e  8e  
( )
1,1
kNS  1 1 0.8 1 1 1 0 0.8 
( )
2,1
kNS  0.011 0.529 0.551 0.481 0.582 0.494 0.615 0.807 
( )
3,1
kNS  0.714 0.857 0.571 0.857 1 0.857 1 1 
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Here, we set 1 0.5 = , 2 0.45 = , and 3 0.5 = . Due to 
(7)
1,1 1NS   and 
(1)
2,1 2NS  , we 
infer that expert 7e  has the feature of dishonest behavior, and 1e  has the characteristic of 
disobedient behavior.  
(ii) Feedback process for sociometric modifying 
Due to experts 1e  and 7e  having non-cooperative behaviors, the trust values towards 1e  
and 7e  in the social trust network are suggested to be decreased. After updating their trust values, 
the experts provide the adjusted sociometric provided below: 
2
0.92 0.82 0.95 0.78 0.86 0.8 0.8
0.85 0.75 0.85 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8
0.8 1 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.85 1
0.75 0.82 0.82 0.95 0.9 0.7 0.9
0.76 0.88 0.94 0.93 0.83 0.85 0.95
0.87 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.82 0.88 0.92
0.75 0.8 0.8 0.96 0.87 0.77 0.94
0.76 0.87 0.87
S
−
−
−
−
=
−
−
−
0.82 0.75 0.81 0.8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 − 
. 
(ii) Feedback process for decision matrices modifying 
Utilizing Eq. (12) generates the collective decision matrix 
( ,1)cV , which is provided in Table 
20: 
Table 20: Decision matrix 
( , 1)cV  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.436 0.5 0.291 0.369 
2x  0.477 0.599 0.468 0.414 
3x  0.383 0.432 0.575 0.351 
4x  0.641 0.437 0.596 0.568 
Let ( , 2) ( , 2)
4 4( )
k k
ijV v =  be the updated decision matrix associated with 
( ,1) ( ,1)
4 4( )
k k
ijV v = . 
When providing 
( , 2)kV , we suggest that: ( ,2) ( ,1) ( ,1) ( ,1) ( ,1)[min{ , },  max{ , }]k k group k groupij ij ij ij ijv v v v v . 
The adjusted decision matrices 
( , 2) ( , 2)
4 4( )
k k
ijV v =  ( 1,2,...,8)k =  given by experts are as 
follows: 
Table 21: Decision matrices 
(1, 2)V  and (2, 2)V  
 (1, 2)V   (2, 2)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.55 0.42 0.37 0.4  0.42 0.53 0.29 0.345 
2x  0.65 0.58 0.68 0.4  0.4 0.53 0.44 0.41 
3x  0.68 0.44 0.48 0.3  0.37 0.45 0.53 0.32 
4x  0.68 0.62 0.52 0.68  0.66 0.55 0.6 0.55 
Table 22: Decision matrices 
(3, 2)V  and (4, 2)V  
 (3, 2)V   (4, 2)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.425 0.4 0.3 0.38 
 0.4 0.55 0.3 0.38 
2x  0.55 0.65 0.47 0.4 
 0.45 0.62 0.46 0.5 
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3x  0.4 0.4 0.59 0.45 
 0.35 0.39 0.55 0.35 
4x  0.63 0.4 0.62 0.53 
 0.7 0.4 0.61 0.54 
Table 23: Decision matrices 
(5, 2)V  and (6, 2)V  
 (5, 2)V   (6, 2)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.45 0.55 0.2 0.38 
 0.45 0.48 0.27 0.34 
2x  0.45 0.57 0.44 0.4 
 0.477 0.65 0.47 0.41 
3x  0.32 0.41 0.51 0.39 
 0.35 0.5 0.62 0.28 
4x  0.7 0.435 0.61 0.68 
 0.65 0.49 0.58 0.52 
Table 24: Decision matrices 
(7, 2)V  and (8, 2)V  
 (7, 2)V   (8, 2)V  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
 
1a  2a  3a  4a  
1x  0.5 0.52 0.29 0.37  0.4 0.5 0.25 0.34 
2x  0.48 0.45 0.465 0.39  0.48 0.6 0.47 0.42 
3x  0.35 0.4 0.565 0.35  0.39 0.45 0.62 0.42 
4x  0.4 0.25 0.45 0.55  0.62 0.43 0.57 0.55 
 
(iii) Generating the weights of the eight experts 
The weights of experts are derived from 2S  using Eq. (8), 2 (0.117,  0.13,  0.123,  0.131, =  
0.124,  0.123,  0.118,  0.134)T . 
(iv) Consensus measure 
By applying Eq. (11), the consensus level in this consensus round can be obtained, 
2 0.932cl = . This indicates that the predefined consensus level among the eight experts has been 
reached. 
Finally, the selection process is adopted to find the collective ranking of alternatives, that is 
4 2 3 1x x x xf f f . 
6. Simulation and comparison analysis 
This section presents several simulation and comparison experiments to investigate the 
efficiency of the SNA-based CRP for dealing with the non-cooperative behaviors. 
 
6.1. The design of simulation methods 
In simulation methods, the initial multiple attribute decision matrices and sociometric 
associated with the social trust network are randomly generated. Then, we take them as the input 
of the proposed CRP, based on which we can obtain the consensus success ratio ( P ), the 
consensus rounds ( Z ), and the adjusted distance of experts’ multiple attribute decision matrices 
( AD ). We devise three simulation methods (i.e., simulation methods I-III) in the following. The 
three simulation methods are based on a natural hypothesis: if an expert is inferred as adopting 
non-cooperative behavior(s), the trust values towards her/him in the social trust network shall 
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decreased by other experts. 
(1) Simulation experiment I 
The basic idea of Simulation method I is provided below: 
If the expert 
ke  is deduced as using the dishonest behavior in the CRP, then based on the 
above hypothesis, other experts he  ( h k ) will decrease the trust values to expert ke . 
Simulation method I is described in Table 25. 
Table 25: Simulation method I 
Input: m , n , l ,  , maxz ,  , 1 ,   and g . 
Output: P , Z  and AD . 
Step 1: We randomly generate m  n l  decision matrices 
(1) ( ){ ,  ...,  }mV V
 
and a sociometric 
( )ij m mS s = , where 
( )k
ijv  is randomly and uniformly generated from the interval [0,  1] , and ijs  is randomly 
and uniformly generated from the interval [0.9,  1] . 
Step 2: Let 0z = , ( , ) ( )k z kV V= . Using the propagation method presented in section 2.2, we can get a 
complete sociometric among experts ( ) ( )( )z zij m mS s =  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m= . 
Step 3: Use Eq. (8) to generate the experts’ weights 
1, 2, ,( ,  ,  ...,  )
T
z z z m z   = , where 
( )
1, 
, ( )
1 1, 
m z
iki i k
k z m m z
ikk i i k
s
s
 = 
= = 
=

 
. 
Step 4: Applying Eq. (11) offers the consensus level, zcl . If zcl   
or maxz z , then go to Step 7; 
otherwise, continue with the next step. 
Step 5: If 0z = , then let ( 1) ( )z zS S+ = ; otherwise, apply Eq. (17) to yield 
( , )
1
i zNS ( 1,2,.., )i m= . Based on 
the above hypothesis, if 
( , )
1 1
i zNS   ( 1)z  , then experts ke  ( 1,2,.., ,  )k m k i=   will reduce the trust 
values of expert ie . We assume that the updated sociometric 
( 1) ( 1)( )z zij m mS s
+ +
=  ( 1)z   is given by the 
following way: 
(i) If 
( , )
1 1
i zNS  , then let ( 1) ( )z zki kis s
+ =  for 1,  2,  ...,  k m=  and k i . 
(ii) If 
( , )
1 1
i zNS  , then let ( 1) ( )max( ,  0)z zki kis s 
+ = −  for 1,  2,  ...,  k m=  and k i . 
Step 6: Employ Eq. (12) to provide the collective decision matrix ( , ) ( , )( )c z c zij n lV v = , where 
( , ) ( , )
,1
mc z k z
ij k z ijk
v v
=
= . Meanwhile, Eq. (16) is adopted to obtain zY . When constructing ( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n lV v+ + =  
( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m= , the following two cases are considered. 
Case A: k g . Expert ke  gives 
( , 1)k zV +  as below: 
(i) For 1,  2,  ...,  i n= , 1,  2, ...,  j l= , and , 0i zy = , then let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )(1 )k z k z c zij ij ijv v v 
+ = − + , where the 
value of u  is selected from [0.15,  1] . 
(ii) For , 1i zy =  and 1,  2, ...,  j l= , then the value of 
( , 1)k z
ijv
+
 is generated from [0,  1] ; 
Utilize Eq. (17) to offer 
( , 1)
1
k zNS + . Repeat (i) and (ii) until 
( , 1)
1 1
k zNS +   ( )k g . 
Case B: g k m  . Here, the expert ke  provides 
( , 1)k zV + , as follows: 
For 1,  2,  ...,  i n=  and 1,  2, ...,  j l= , then let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )(1 )k z k z c zij ij ijv v v 
+ = − + , where the value of u  is 
produced from [0.15,  1] . 
Let 1z z= + , then go to Step 3. 
Step 7: Let 
( , 1) ( , )
1 1 1
1
| |
m n l
k z k z
ij ij
k i j
AD AD v v
m n l
+
= = =
= + −
 
 . 
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Step 8: If zcl  , then 1P = ; otherwise 0P = . Let Z z= . Output P , Z  and AD . 
(2) Simulation method II 
Similar to Simulation method I, Simulation method II is devised. In Simulation method II, if 
the expert 
ke  is deduced as adopting the disobedient behavior in the CRP, then other experts he  
( h k ) will reduce the trust values to expert ke . In Simulation method I, by replacing Input and 
Steps 5 and 6 with Input A and Steps 5-A and 6-A below, respectively, we then obtain simulation 
method II. 
Input A: m , n , l ,  , maxz , 2 ,   and g . 
Step 5-A: If 0z = , then let 
( 1) ( )z zS S+ = ; otherwise, adopt Eq. (21) to yield ( , )2
i zNS ( 1,2,.., )i m= . 
If 
( , )
2 2
i zNS   ( 1)z  , then experts ke  ( 1,2,.., ,  )k m k i=   will reduce the trust values of expert 
ie . We assume the updated sociometric 
( 1) ( 1)( )z zij m mS s
+ +
=  ( 1)z   is given using the following way: 
(i) If 
( , )
2 2
i zNS  , then let ( 1) ( )z zki kis s
+ =  for 1,  2,  ...,  k m=  and k i . 
(ii) If 
( , )
2 2
i zNS  , then let ( 1) ( )max( ,  0)z zki kis s 
+ = −  for 1,  ...,  k m=  and k i . 
Step 6-A: Employ Eq. (12) to yield the collective decision matrix ( , ) ( , )( )c z c zij n lV v = , where 
( , ) ( , )
,1
mc z k z
ij k z ijk
v v
=
= . When constructing ( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n lV v+ + =  ( 1,  ...,  )k m= , two cases are taken into 
account. 
Case A: k g . Here, the expert ke  provides 
( , 1)k zV +  as follows: 
For 1,  2,  ...,  i n=  and 1,  2, ...,  j l= , let a  and b  be two real numbers and they are randomly 
and uniformly generated from interval [0,  1] , (i) if 0.5a  , let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )(1 )k z k z c zij ij ijv v v 
+ = − +  with the 
value of u  is uniformly and randomly selected from the interval 2[0,  ] , (ii) if 0.5a   and 
0.5b  , then 
( , 1)k z
ijv
+
 is randomly and uniformly generated from interval 
( , ) ( , )[0,  min( ,  )]k z c zij ijv v , if 
0.5a   and 0.5b  , then 
( , 1)k z
ijv
+
 is randomly and uniformly generated from interval 
( , ) ( , )[max( ,  ),  1]k z c zij ijv v . 
Case B: g k m  . Here, the expert ke  provides 
( , 1)k zV + , as follows: 
For 1,  2,  ...,  i n=  and 1,  2, ...,  j l= , then let 
( , 1) ( , ) ( , )(1 )k z k z c zij ij ijv v v 
+ = − + , where u  is produced 
from 2[ ,  1] . 
Let 1z z= + , then go to Step 3. 
 
(3) Simulation method III 
Simulation method III is designed to investigate whether the SNA-based consensus reaching 
framework can manage divergent behaviors, and the main idea of this simulation method is also 
similar to that of Simulation method I. In Simulation method III, if expert ke  is concluded as 
adopting a divergent behavior in the CRP, the trust values towards expert ke  in the social trust 
network will be reduced by other experts he  ( )h k . Specifically, Simulation method III can be 
yielded by replacing Input and Steps 5 and 6 with Input B and Steps 5-B and 6-B in Simulation 
method I, respectively. 
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Input B: m , n , l ,  , maxz , 3 ,  ,   and g . 
Step 5-B: If 0z = , then let 
( 1) ( )z zS S+ = ; otherwise, utilize Eq. (24) to produce 
( , )
3
i zNS ( 1,2,.., )i m= . If ( , )3 3
i zNS   ( 1)z  , then experts ke  ( )k i  will reduce the trust values 
associated with the expert ie . Here, the updated sociometric 
( 1) ( 1)( )z zij m mS s
+ +
=  ( 1)z   is built using the 
following approach: 
(i) If 
( , )
3 3
i zNS  , then let ( 1) ( )z zki kis s
+ =  for k i . 
(ii) If 
( , )
3 3
i zNS  , then let ( 1) ( )max( ,  0)z zki kis s 
+ = −  for 1,  2,  ...,  k m=  and k i . 
Step 6-B: Applying Eq. (12) produces the collective decision matrix ( , ) ( , )( )c z c zij n lV v = , where 
( , ) ( , )
,1
mc z k z
ij k z ijk
v v
=
= . When building ( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n lV v+ + =  ( 1,  2,  ...,  )k m= , cases A and B are considered. 
Case A: g k m  . Expert ke  provides 
( , 1)k zV + , as follows: 
For 1,  2,  ...,  i n=  and 1,  2, ...,  j l= , then ( , 1)k zijv
+
 is randomly and uniformly generated from interval 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )[min( ,  ),  max( ,  )]k z c z k z c zij ij ij ijv v v v . 
Case B: k g . Here, expert ke  provides 
( , 1) ( , 1)( )k z k zij n lV v
+ +
=  as below: 
(i) For 1,  2,  ...,  i n=  and 1,  2, ...,  j l= , then 
( , 1)k z
ijv
+
 is generated from [0,  1] . 
Use Eq. (24) to produce 
( , 1)
3
k zNS + . Repeat (i) until ( , 1)3 3
k zNS +   ( )k g . 
Let 1z z= + , then go to Step 3. 
Note 3: In Simulation methods I-III, (1) the parameter   ( [0,  1])  represents the 
penalty coefficient, and the larger   value represents the larger the penalty strength; (2) the 
parameter g  represents the number of experts who take non-cooperative behaviors in the CRP, 
and the purpose of Steps 6, 6-A, and 6-B is to ensure that experts 1{ ,  ...,  }ge e  have dishonest, 
disobedient, and divergent behaviors, respectively. 
6.2. The design of comparison methods 
In the proposed SNA-based consensus reaching framework, the experts’ weights generated 
from the social trust network are dynamically updated and embedded into the CRP. However, in 
traditional CRPs with the social trust network (e.g., [53, 55]), the experts’ weights keep unchanged 
throughout the CRP. In particular, we omit Steps 6, 6-A, and 6-B from Simulation methods I-III , 
which yields three new methods denominated as Simulation methods I*- III* based on the 
traditional CRPs with social trust networks, respectively. Based on this, the consensus efficiency 
of the proposed SNA-based consensus reaching framework and the traditional CRPs under a 
social trust network will be compared. 
6.3. Simulation and comparison results 
Here, the simulation and comparison results are presented. 
Simulation method I, we fix max 5z = , 6n = , 5l = , 0.3 = , and 0.9 = . Then, we set 
different input parameters m , 1 ,  , and g , and we run simulation method I 1000 times to 
produce the average values of P , Z  and AD , respectively. The average P , z  and AD  
value, respectively, reflect the success ratio, the number of rounds required for achieving the 
established consensus level, and the amount of preference adjustment required in the simulation 
experiment. The average values of P , z  and AD , for Simulation method I under different 
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input parameters, are listed in Table 26. 
Table 26: Average values of P , Z  and AD  in Simulation method I 
  g=1  g=2  g=3 
  0.15 =   0.35 =   0.15 =   0.35 =   0.15 =   0.35 =  
m 1  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD 
6 0.1 1 2.149 0.219  1 2.043 0.213  1 2.973 0.308  1 2.83 0.292  0.987 4.228 0.463  1 3.017 0.357 
 0.3 1 2.146 0.219  1 2.033 0.212  1 2.971 0.306  1 2.813 0.291  0.993 4.218 0.458  1 3.004 0.355 
                         9 0.1 1 2.003 0.209  1 2 0.208  1 2.43 0.252  1 2.229 0.234  1 2.989 0.313  1 2.865 0.3 
 0.3 1 2 0.209  1 2 0.209  1 2.408 0.25  1 2.166 0.236  1 2.972 0.313  1 2.861 0.301 
                         12 0.1 1 2 0.208  1 2 0.207  1 2.054 0.225  1 2.006 0.221  1 2.68 0.276  1 2.27 0.25 
 0.3 1 2 0.207  1 2 0.208  1 2.059 0.225  1 2.003 0.222  1 2.654 0.273  1 2.259 0.249 
In Simulation method II, we set max 5z = , 6n = , 5l = , and 0.9 = . We then run 
simulation method II 1000 times under different input parameters m , 2 ,  , and g  to get the 
average values of P , Z  and AD , which are listed in Table 27. 
Table 27: Average values of P , Z  and AD  in Simulation method II 
  g=1  g=2  g=3 
  0.15 =   0.35 =   0.15 =   0.35 =   0.15 =   0.35 =  
m 2  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD 
6 0.2 1 3.062 0.269  1 2.875 0.256  0.176 5 0.458  1 3.454 0.341  0 5 0.561  1 4 0.451 
 0.4 1 2.377 0.252  1 2.036 0.232  0.72 4.969 0.481  1 3.001 0.329  0 5 0.593  1 4 0.475 
                         9 0.2 1 2.653 0.241  1 2.138 0.218  1 3.948 0.338  1 3 0.285  0.192 5 0.459  1 3.312 0.338 
 0.4 1 2.223 0.23  1 2.027 0.229  1 3.115 0.311  1 2.738 0.286  0.875 4.99 0.483  1 3 0.335 
                         12 0.2 1 2.073 0.215  1 2.055 0.211  1 3.01 0.275  1 2.981 0.271  1 4.252 0.368  1 3 0.296 
 0.4 1 2.065 0.229  1 2 0.228  1 2.341 0.258  1 2.002 0.241  1 3.672 0.355  1 2.994 0.312 
In Simulation method III, the parameters are fixed as max 5z = , 6n = , 5l = , 0.28 = , 
and 0.9 = . When setting different input parameters m , 3 ,  , and g  for Simulation 
method III, we run simulation method III 1000 times to obtain the average values of P , Z  and 
AD , which are listed in Table 28. 
Table 28: Average values of P , Z  and AD  in Simulation method III  
  g=1  g=2  g=3 
  0.15 =   0.35 =   0.15 =   0.35 =   0.15 =   0.35 =  
m 2  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD  P Z AD 
6 0.2 1 4.009 0.429  1 3.221 0.343  0 5 0.772  1 4 0.617  0 5 1.04  1 4 0.815 
 0.4 1 4.008 0.427  1 3.203 0.343  0 5 0.772  1 4 0.618  0 5 1.04  1 4 0.816 
                         9 0.2 1 3.064 0.31  1 3.012 0.302  1 4.946 0.59  1 3.045 0.404  0 5 0.779  1 4 0.629 
 0.4 1 3.051 0.307  1 3.031 0.301  1 4.898 0.581  1 3.029 0.399  0 5 0.769  1 4 0.621 
                         12 0.2 1 3.057 0.285  1 3.021 0.282  1 4.251 0.436  1 3.011 0.355  1 5 0.644  1 3.27 0.456 
 0.4 1 3.012 0.283  1 3 0.281  1 4.123 0.434  1 3 0.353  1 5 0.638  1 3.194 0.444 
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Meanwhile, we set 2g = , 7n = , 6l = , max 5z = , 0.92 = , and regarding the threshold 
values for identifying non-cooperative behaviors, let (1) 0.3 =  and 1 0.1 =  for simulation 
method I; (2) 
2 0.2 =  for simulation method II; (3) 0.25 =  and 3 0.5 =  for simulation 
method III. When setting different parameters m  and  , we run Simulation methods I-III 1000 
times, respectively, to produce the average values of P , Z  and AD , which are described as 
Figs. 5-7. 
 
Fig.5. Average values of P , Z  and AD  under simulation method I 
 
Fig.6. Average values of P , Z  and AD  under simulation method II 
 
Fig.7. Average values of P , Z  and AD  under simulation method III 
Let 7l = , 8n = , max 5z = , 1 0.5 = , 2 0.35 = , 3 0.4 = , 0.25 = , 0.28 = , 
2g = , and 0.25 = . We run Simulation methods I and I*, II and II*, and III and III* 1000 
times under different input parameters m  and  , respectively, to generate the average values of 
P , Z  and AD , which are visualized in Figs. 8-10. 
 
Fig.8. Average values of P , Z  and AD  under simulation methods I and I* 
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Fig.9. Average values of P , Z  and AD  under simulation methods II and II* 
 
Fig.10. Average values of P , Z  and AD  under simulation methods III and III* 
The results of the above simulation experiments and comparative analysis show that: 
(1) The SNA-based consensus reaching framework can manage dishonest, disobedient, and 
divergent behaviors effectively when setting different parameters. Generally, the consensus 
success ratios are 1 in most cases, and 2-3 consensus rounds are often required to reach the 
predefined consensus level. Moreover, the adjustment distances are 0.2-0.4 in most cases. 
(2) With the increase of the proportion of the experts who take non-cooperative behaviors, 
the consensus success ratios have the tendency to decrease, and the consensus rounds increase 
alongside the preference adjustment distances. This implies that the effectiveness of the proposed 
consensus reaching framework for coping with non-cooperative behaviors varies, depending on 
the proportion of the experts who take non-cooperative behaviors in the group. 
(3) When the values of 
1 , 2  and 3  increase or   value increases, the average values 
of P  increase, and the average values of Z  decrease. These observations imply that the success 
ratio of reaching the predefined consensus level will be improved and the speed to reach the 
predefined consensus level will be accelerated when using a relaxed criterion to infer the 
non-cooperative behaviors or applying a strong penalty. 
(4) There are higher consensus success ratios in the SNA-based consensus reaching with 
non-cooperative behaviors management framework than in the traditional CRP with social trust 
network, which indicates that the SNA-based consensus reaching framework can increase the 
success ratio of achieving the predefined consensus level under the presence of non-cooperative 
behaviors, by effectively dealing with them. 
(5) The average consensus rounds in the SNA-based consensus framework with 
non-cooperative behaviors management are lower than those in the traditional CRP approaches 
under social trust networks, which means that the proposed consensus framework can accelerate 
the speed of convergence to achieve the predefined consensus level. 
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(6) The adjustment distances in the proposed SNA-based consensus reaching framework with 
non-cooperative behavior management are lower than those in the traditional CRP with social trust 
network, which implies that the proposed SNA-based consensus reaching framework can decrease 
the preference information loss by dealing with the non-cooperative behaviors. 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigated the non-cooperative behaviors in the CRP in the MAGDM 
context, and proposed a consensus reaching framework based on SNA to manage different 
patterns of non-cooperative behaviors exhibited by participants in the process of building 
consensus. The main motivations and resulting contributions of this study are summarized below. 
(1) In the CRP, the trust relationships among experts play a key role, which will influence the 
decision results. However, the trust relationships are rarely considered by existing CRP models. 
By taking the trust relationships among experts into account, we developed a SNA-based 
consensus reaching framework, which can provide a better approximation to real decision 
situations in which there exist diverse relationships among participants. 
(2) The behavior analysis module is designed in the SNA-based consensus framework, and 
the analysis results are provided for experts to modify their trust values in the social trust network. 
Meanwhile, a mechanism to dynamically generate experts’ weights from the social trust network 
is presented, and subsequently embedded into the consensus model. 
(3) We define several common patterns of non-cooperative behaviors, namely dishonest, 
disobedient, and divergent behaviors. Likewise, we devise several simulation and comparison 
experiments to verify the efficiency and validity of the SNA-based framework for coping with 
diverse non-cooperative behaviors in the CRP, by weighting experts based on social trust 
information. 
Meanwhile, two interesting research directions are pointed out for future work: 
(1) In real word CRPs, the preferences of experts are often formed in a complex interpersonal 
environment where preferences are liable to change due to social influences [7]. We believe that it 
will be very interesting in future research to incorporate the impact of social influence on the 
evaluation of experts’ preferences in the SNA-based consensus reaching framework. 
(2) The large-scale GDM has become a hot research topic along with the development of 
technology and society [37, 71, 72]. In future research, we plan to design a SNA-based approach 
to cope with non-cooperative behaviors in a large-scale GDM, in which a larger and more 
complex sociometric structure would be present. 
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